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Abstract
When an outside innovating firm has a cost-reducing technology, it can sell licenses of
its technology to incumbent firms, or enter the market and at the same time sell licenses,
or enter the market without license. We examine the definitions of license fees in such
situations under oligopoly with three firms, one outside innovating firm and two incumbent
firms, considering threat by entry of the innovating firm using a two-step auction.
Keywords: license; entry; oligopoly; innovating firm; two-step auction.
JEL Code: D43; L13.
1. Introduction
In Proposition 4 of Kamien and Tauman (1986) it was argued that in an oligopoly when the
number of firms is small (or very large), strategy to enter the market and at the same time
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license the cost-reducing technology to the incumbent firm (license with entry strategy) is more
profitable than strategy to license its technology to the incumbent firm without entering the
market (license without entry strategy) for the innovating firm. However, their result depends
on their definition of license fee. They defined the license fee in the case of licenses without
entry by the diﬀerence between the profit of an incumbent firm in that case and its profit before
it buys a license without entry of the innovating firm. However, it is inappropriate from the
game theoretic view point. If an incumbent firm does not buy a license, the innovating firm
may punish the incumbent firm by entering the market. The innovating firm can use such a
threat if and only if it is a credible threat. In a duopoly case with one incumbent firm, when
the innovating firm does not enter nor sell a license, its profit is zero; on the other hand, when
it enters the market without license, its profit is positive. Therefore, threat by entry without
license is credible under duopoly, and then even if the innovating firm does not enter themarket,
the incumbent firm must pay the diﬀerence between its profit when it uses the new technology
and its profit when the innovating firm enters without license as a license fee. For example,
Hattori and Tanaka (2016) presented analyses of license and entry choice by an innovating
firm in a duopoly.
However, in an oligopoly with more than one incumbent firms, the credibility of threat by
entry is a more subtle problem. In this paper we examine definitions of license fees under
oligopoly with three firms, one outside innovating firm and two incumbent firms, considering
a two-step auction in the case of licenses without entry. A two-step auction, for example, in
the case of a license to one incumbent firm without entry is as follows.
(1) The first step.
The innovating firm sells a license to one firm at auction without its entry conditional
on that the bidding price must not be smaller than the minimum bidding price, which is
equal to the willingness to pay for the incumbent firms described below. A firm with the
maximum bidding price gets a license. If both firms make bids at the same price, one
firm is chosen at random. If no firm makes a bid, then the auction proceeds to the next
step.
(2) The second step.
The innovating firm sells a license to one firm at auction with its entry.
At the first step of the auction, each incumbent firm has a will to pay the following license fee;
the diﬀerence between its profit when only this firm uses the new technology
without entry of the innovating firm and its profit when only the rival firm buys
the license with entry of the innovating firm.
In the first step each incumbent firm has an incentive to make a bid when the other firm does
not make a bid. On the other hand, it does not have an incentive to make a bid when the other
firm makes a bid.
We need the minimum bidding price because if there is no minimum price, when one of
the incumbent firms makes a bid which is slightly but strictly smaller than this price, the other
firm does not have an incentive to outperform this bidding.
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A two-step auction in the case of licenses to two incumbent firms without entry is similar1,
and at the first step of the auction the incumbent firm has a will to pay the following license
fee;
the diﬀerence between its profit when both firms use the new technology without
entry of the innovating firm and its profit when only the rival firm buys the license
with entry of the innovating firm.
In the first step each incumbent firm has an incentive to make a bid when the other firm
makes a bid because if it does not make a bid, the auction proceed to the next step.
Threat by such a two-step auction is credible if and only if the profit of the innovating firm
when it enters the market with a license to one firm is larger than its profit when it licenses to
one incumbent firm without entering the market.
The analyses of optimum strategy, to enter with or without license or to license without
entry for the innovating firm is the theme of the future research.
In the next section we present literature review. In Section 3 the model of this paper is
described. In Section 4 we consider various equilibria of the oligopoly. In Section 5 we
present the license fees under the license with entry strategy. In Section 6 we consider a two-
step auction and present the definitions of license fees under the license without entry strategy.
In Section 7 we present an example. Section 8 is a concluding section. In the appendix we
briefly mention the two-step auctions when there are more than two incumbent firms.
2. Literature review
Various studies focus on technology adoption orR&D investment in duopoly or oligopoly. Most
of them analyze the relation between the technology licensor and licensee. The diﬀerence of
means of contracts, which comprise royalties, upfront fixed fees, combinations of these two,
and auctions, are well discussed (Katz and Shapiro (1985)). Kamien and Tauman (2002)
show that outside innovators prefer auctions, but industry incumbents prefer royalty. This topic
is discussed by Kabiraj (2004) under the Stackelberg oligopoly; here, the licensor does not
have production capacity. Wang and Yang (2004) consider the case when the licensor has
production capacity. Sen and Tauman (2007) compared the license system in detail, namely,
when the licensor is an outsider and when it is an incumbent firm, using the combination of
royalties and fixed fees. However, the existence of production capacity was externally given,
and they did not analyze the choice of entry. Therefore, the optimal strategies of outside
innovators, who can use the entry as a threat, require more discussion. Regarding the strategies
of new entrants to the market, Duchene, Sen and Serfes (2015) focused on future entrants
with old technology, and argued that while a low license fee can be used to deter the entry
of potential entrants, the firm with new technology is incumbent, and its choice of entry is
not analyzed. Also, Chen (2016) analyzed the model of the endogenous market structure
determined by the potential entrant with old technology and showed that the licensor uses the
fixed fee and zero royalty in both the incumbent and the outside innovator cases, which are
1Please see Section 6.2.2.
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exogenously given. Below, we present a brief review of studies that analyzed related topics. A
Cournot oligopoly with fixed fee under cost asymmetry was analyzed by La Manna (1993).
He showed that if technologies can be replicated perfectly, a lower cost firm always has the
incentive to transfer its technology; hence, while a Cournot-Nash equilibrium cannot be fully
asymmetric, there exists no non-cooperative Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. On the other
hand, using cooperative game theory,Watanabe andMuto (2008) analyzed bargaining between
a licensor with no production capacity and oligopolistic firms. Recent research focuses on
market structure and technology improvement. Boone (2001) and Matsumura et. al. (2013)
found a non-monotonic relation between intensity of competition and innovation. Also, Pal
(2010) showed that technology adoption may change the market outcome. The social welfare
is larger in Bertrand competition than in Cournot competition. However, if we consider
technology adoption, Cournot competition may result in higher social welfare than Bertrand
competition under a diﬀerentiated goods market. Hattori and Tanaka (2016), Hattori and
Tanaka (2015) studied the adoption of new technology in Cournot duopoly and Stackelberg
duopoly. Rebolledo and Sandonís (2012) presented an analysis of the eﬀectiveness of research
and development (R&D) subsidies in an oligopolistic model in the cases of international
competition and cooperation in R&D. Hattori and Tanaka (2016) analyzed similar problems
about product innovation, that is, introduction of higher quality good in a duopoly with vertical
product diﬀerentiation.
3. Themodel
There are three firms, Firms A, B and C. At present two of them, Firms B and C, produce a
homogeneous good. Firm A, which is an outside firm, has a superior cost-reducing technology
and can produce the good at lower cost than Firms B and C. We call Firm A the innovating
firm, and Firms B and C the incumbent firms. Firm A have the following five options.
(1) To enter the market without license to incumbent firms.
(2) To enter the market and license its technology to one incumbent firm.
(3) To enter the market and license its technology to two incumbent firms.
(4) To license its technology to one incumbent firm, but not enter the market.
(5) To license its technology to two incumbent firms, but not enter the market.
Let p be the price, xA, xB and xC be the outputs of Firms A, B and C. Then, the inverse
demand function of the good is written as follows.
p D p.xA C xB C xC /; when Firm A enters;
p D p.xB C xC /; when Firm A does not enter:
The cost functions of Firms A, B and C are denoted by cA.xA/, cB.xB/ and cC .xC /. cB./
and cC ./ are the same functions without license. If Firm A licenses its technology to two
incumbent firms, all cost functions are the same, and if Firm A licenses its technology to one
incumbent firm (for example Firm C), then the cost functions of Firms A and C are the same.
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4. Equilibria of the oligopoly
4.1. Entry without license case
We suppose that Firm A enters the market without license to incumbent firms. Then, the
market becomes a tripoly. The cost function of Firm C is cB . The profits of Firms A, B and C
are written as
A D p.xA C xB C xC /xA   cA.xA/;
B D p.xA C xB C xC /xB   cB.xB/;
C D p.xA C xB C xC /xC   cB.xC /:
We assume Cournot type behavior of the firms. The conditions for profit maximization are
p C p0xA   c0A D 0; p C p0xB   c0B D 0; p C p0xC   c0B D 0:
The second order conditions are
2p0 C p00xA   c00A < 0; 2p0 C p00xB   c00B < 0; 2p0 C p00xC   c00B < 0:
Hereafter we assume that the second order conditions in each case are satisfied.
Denote the equilibrium profits in this case by e0A , e0B and e0C .
4.2. License to one firmwithout entry case
Suppose that Firm A licenses its technology to one firm, Firm C, but it does not enter the
market. Then, the market is a duopoly. The cost function of Firm C is cA. The profits of the
firms are written as
B D p.xB C xC /xB   cB.xB/;
C D p.xB C xC /xC   cA.xC /   L:
L denotes the license fee. The conditions for profit maximization are
p C p0xB   c0B D 0; p C p0xC   c0A D 0:
Denote the equilibrium profits and the license fee in this case by  l1B ,  l1C and Ll1.
4.3. Licenses to two firms without entry case
Suppose that Firm A licenses its technology to two firms, Firms B and C, but it does not enter
the market. The cost functions of Firms B and C are cA. The profits of the firms are written as
B D p.xB C xC /xB   cA.xB/   L;
C D p.xB C xC /xC   cA.xC /   L:
L denotes the license fee. The conditions for profit maximization are
p C p0xB   c0A D 0; p C p0xC   c0A D 0:
Denote the equilibrium profits and the license fee in this case by  l2B ,  l2C and Ll2.
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4.4. Entry with license to one firm case
Next suppose that Firm A enters the market and sells a license to one firm, Firm C. The cost
function of Firm C is cA. The profits of Firms A, B and C are written as
A D p.xA C xB C xC /xA   cA.xA/;
B D p.xA C xB C xC /xB   cB.xB/;
C D p.xA C xB C xC /xC   cA.xC /   L:
L is the license fee. The conditions for profit maximization are
p C p0xA   c0A D 0; p C p0xB   c0B D 0; p C p0xC   c0A D 0:
Denote the equilibrium profits and the license fee in this case by e1A , e1B , e1C and Le1.
4.5. Entry with licenses to two firms case
Next suppose that Firm A enters the market and sells licenses to Firms B and C. The cost
functions of Firms B and C are cA. The profits of Firms A, B and C are written as
A D p.xA C xB C xC /xA   cA.xA/;
B D p.xA C xB C xC /xB   cA.xB/   L;
C D p.xA C xB C xC /xC   cA.xC /   L:
L is the license fee. The conditions for profit maximization are
p C p0xA   c0A D 0; p C p0xB   c0A D 0; p C p0xC   c0A D 0:
Denote the equilibrium profits and the license fee in this case by e2A , e2B , e2C and Le2.
5. License fees in the case of licenses with entry
In the case of licenses with entry the license fees are equal to the usual willingness to pay for
the incumbent firms. We follow the arguments by Kamien and Tauman (1986) and Sen and
Tauman (2007) about license fees by auction.
5.1. License to one firm
The willingness to pay for each incumbent firm is equal to
the diﬀerence between its profit when only this firm uses the new technology with
entry of the innovating firm and its profit when only the rival firm buys the license
with entry of the innovating firm.
This is because the incumbent firms know that there will be one licensee regardless of whether
or not it buys a license. Then, the license fee is
Le1 D .e1C C Le1/   e1B :
This equation means e1C D e1B .
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5.2. Licenses to two firms
The willingness to pay for each incumbent firm in this case is equal to
the diﬀerence between its profit when two firms use the new technology with entry
of the innovating firm and its profit when only the rival firm buys the license with
entry of the innovating firm.
This is because the incumbent firms know that there will be one licensee when it does not buy
a license. In this case there is a minimum bidding price which is equal to the willingness to
pay for the incumbents because without the minimum bidding price no firm makes a positive
bid. The license fee is
Le2 D .e2C C Le2/   e1B :
This means e2C D e1B .
6. License fees in the case of licenses without entry:
two-step auction
6.1. One-step auction
If the licenses are auctioned oﬀ to the incumbent firms by one-step auction, the license fee is
determined by the usual willingness to pay for the incumbent firms described in Kamien and
Tauman (1986) and Sen and Tauman (2007).
6.1.1. License to one firm
The willingness to pay for each incumbent firm is equal to
the diﬀerence between its profit when only this firm uses the new technology
without entry of the innovating firm and its profit when only the rival firm buys
the license without entry of the innovating firm.
Then, the license fee is
Ll1 D . l1C C Ll1/    l1B :
This equation means  l1C D  l1B . Denote Ll1 in this case by QLl1.
6.1.2. Licenses to two firms
The willingness to pay for each incumbent firm in this case is equal to
the diﬀerence between its profit when two firms use the new technology without
entry of the innovating firm and its profit when only the rival firm buys the license
without entry of the innovating firm.
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In this case there is a minimum bidding price which is equal to the willingness to pay for the
incumbents. The license fee is
Ll2 D . l2C C Ll2/    l1B :
This means  l2C D  l1B . Denote Ll2 in this case by QLl2.
6.2. Two-step auction
We consider a two-step auction for each case.
6.2.1. License to one firm
In this case the two-step auction is practiced as follows.
(1) The first step.
The innovating firm sells a license to one firm at auction without its entry conditional
on that the bidding price must not be smaller than the minimum bidding price, which is
equal to the willingness to pay for the incumbent firms described below. A firm with the
maximum bidding price gets a license. If both firms make bids at the same price, one
firm is chosen at random. If no firm makes a bid, then the auction proceeds to the next
step.
(2) The second step.
The innovating firm sells a license to one firm at auction with its entry. Then, the
willingness to pay for each incumbent firm in this step is
e1C C Le1   e1B :
At the first step of the auction, each incumbent firm has a will to pay the following license fee;
the diﬀerence between its profit when only this firm uses the new technology
without entry of the innovating firm and its profit when only the rival firm buys
the license with entry of the innovating firm.
Then, the license fee is
Ll1 D . l1C C Ll1/   e1B :
This equation means  l1C D e1B . Denote Ll1 in this case by OLl1.
In the first step each incumbent firm has an incentive to make a bid with the license fee Ll1
when the other firm does not make a bid. On the other hand, it does not have an incentive to
make a bid when the other firm makes a bid.
We need the minimum bidding price Ll1 because the profit of a non-licensee is  l1B which
is larger than e1B . If there is no minimum price, when one of the incumbent firms makes a bid
which is slightly but strictly smaller than this price, the other firm does not have an incentive
to outperform this bidding.
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6.2.2. Licenses to two firms
We consider the following two-step auction
(1) The first step.
The innovating firm sells licenses to two firms at auction without its entry conditional
on that the bidding price must not be smaller than the minimum bidding price, which is
equal to the willingness to pay for the incumbent firms described below, and both firms
make bids. If both firms make bids, they get licenses. If at least one of the firms does
not make a bid, then the auction proceeds to the next step.
(2) The second step.
The innovating firm sells a license to one firm at auction with its entry. Then, the
willingness to pay for each incumbent firm in this step is
e1C C Le1   e1B :
At the first step of the auction, each incumbent firm has a will to pay the following license fee;
the diﬀerence between its profit when two firms use the new technology without
entry of the innovating firm and its profit when only the rival firm buys the license
with entry of the innovating firm.
The minimum bidding price should be equal to this willingness to pay. Then, the license fee is
Ll2 D . l2C C Ll2/   e1B :
This means  l2C D e1B . Denote Ll2 in this case by OLl2.
In the first step each incumbent firm has an incentive to make a bid when the other firm
makes a bid because if it does not make a bid, the auction proceeds to the next step.
6.3. Credibility of two-step auction
The innovating firm uses a two-step auction if and only if threat by the existence of the second
step auction is credible, and it is credible if and only if the total profit of the innovating firm
when it enters the market with a license to one firm is larger than its profit when it does not
enter and sells a license to one firm. Therefore, if
e1A C Le1 > QLl1;
the two-step auction is credible. On the other hand, if
QLl1 > e1A C Le1;
the two-step auction is not credible.
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7. An example: Linear demand and cost functions
As an example we assume that demand and cost functions are linear. The inverse demand
function is written as follows.
p D a   .xA C xB C xC /
where a is a positive constant. The cost function of Firm A is cAxA, and the cost functions of
Firms B and C are cBxB and cBxC , where 0 < cA < cB . However, if Firm B (or C) buys a
license for using the cost-reducing technology of Firm A, its cost function is cAxB (or cAxC ).
There is no fixed cost. Let
a D 2cB   cA C t.cB   cA/; t > 0:
Then, when t  1 the equilibrium values of the profits of the firms in various cases are obtained
as follows.
e0A D
.cB   cA/2.t C 4/2
16
; e0B D e0C D
.cB   cA/2t2
16
;
e1A D
.cB   cA/2.t C 3/2
16
; e1B D
.cB   cA/2.t   1/2
16
; e1C D
.cB   cA/2.t C 3/2
16
  Le1;
e2A D
.cB   cA/2.t C 2/2
16
; e2B D e2C D
.cB   cA/2.t C 2/2
16
  Le2;
 l1B D
.cB   cA/2t2
9
;  l1C D
.cB   cA/2.t C 3/2
9
  Ll1;
 l2B D  l2C D
.cB   cA/2.t C 2/2
9
  Ll2;
On the other hand, when t < 1, xe1B D 0, and the equilibrium values of the profits of the
firms in the case of entry with a license to one firm are
e1A D
.cB   cA/2.t C 2/2
9
; e1B D 0; e1C D
.cB   cA/2.t C 2/2
9
:
The equilibrium profits in other cases are the same as those when t  1.
Comparing e1B and  l1B , when t > 1
e1B    l1B D  
.cB   cA/2.t C 3/.7t   3/
144
< 0
and when t < 1,
e1B    l1B D  
.cB   cA/2t2
9
< 0:
Thus, threat by entry with a license to the rival firm is more severe than non-entry with license
to the rival firm for the incumbent firms. The total profit of the innovating firm when it enters
the market with a license to one firm is, when t > 1
e1A C Le1 D
.cB   cA/2.t2 C 14t C 17/
16
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Figure 1: Relations among t , e1A C Le1 and QLl1
when t < 1,
e1A C Le1 D
2.cB   cA/2.t C 2/2
9
:
On the other hand, the profit of the innovating firmwhen it sells a license to one firm conditional
on that it does not enter the market is
QLl1 D .cB   cA/
2.2t C 3/
3
:
Comparing them, when t > 1
e1A C Le1   QLl1 D
.cB   cA/2.t C 3/.3t C 1/
48
> 0
and when t < 1
e1A C Le1   QLl1 D
.cB   cA/2.2t2 C 2t   1/
9
:
This is positive if t >
p
3 1
2
, and is negative if t <
p
3 1
2
. Therefore, we obtain the following
results about this example.
If t >
p
3 1
2
, the two-step auction is credible, and if t <
p
3 1
2
, the two-step auction
is not credible.
We illustrate the relations among t , QLl1 and e1A C Le1 in Fig. 1.
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Figure 2: License fee in the case of license to one firm without entry
The license fee in the case of license to one firm without entry when the two-step auction is
credible is
OLl1 D .cB   cA/
2.t C 3/2
9
:
Comparing OLl1 and QLl1 yields
OLl1   QLl1 D .cB   cA/
2t2
9
> 0:
We illustrate the license fee in the case of license to one firm without entry in Fig. 2. It
is discontinuous at t D
p
3 1
2
. Since OLl1 > QLl1, we can define that the license fee when
t D
p
3 1
2
is
.cB   cA/2.t C 3/2
9
D OLl1:
The license fee in the case of licenses to two firms without entry when the two-step auction
is not credible is
QLl2 D 4.cB   cA/
2.t C 1/
9
:
When the two-step auction is credible, it is
OLl2 D .cB   cA/
2.t C 2/2
9
:
Comparing them yields
OLl2   QLl2 D .cB   cA/
2t2
9
> 0:
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Figure 3: License fee in the case of licenses to two firms without entry
We illustrate the license fee in the case of licenses to two firms without entry in Fig. 3. It is
also discontinuous at t D
p
3 1
2
. Since OLl2 > QLl2, we can define that the license fee when
t D
p
3 1
2
is
.cB   cA/2.t C 2/2
9
D OLl2:
8. Concluding remarks and the future research
We have examined the definitions of license fees for new superior technology developed by
an outside innovator in an oligopoly when the innovator may enter the market with or without
licensing. In the future research we will investigate the optimum strategy, to sell licenses to
incumbent firms without entry, or to enter the market with or without license, for the innovating
firm based on the definitions of license fees in the various cases presented in this paper, and we
want to extend the analysis to more general oligopolistic setting with n  3 incumbent firms.
A. A note on the two-step auction with more than two
incumbent firms
We briefly mention the two-step auctions when there are n  3 incumbent firms without entry
of the innovating firm. The equilibrium values of the profits of firms are denoted as follows.
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 lmi
the profit of a licensee when m (m < n) firms buy licenses
without entry of the innovating firm
 lmj
the profit of a non-licensee when m (m < n) firms buy licenses
without entry of the innovating firm
 lni
the profit of a licensee when n firms buy licenses
without entry of the innovating firm
emi
the profit of a licensee when m (m < n) firms buy licenses
with entry of the innovating firm
emj
the profit of a non-licensee when m (m < n) firms buy licenses
with entry of the innovating firm
eni
the profit of a licensee when n firms buy licenses
with entry of the innovating firm
Llm
license fee when m (m < n) firms buy licenses
without entry of the innovating firm
Lln
license fee when n firms buy licenses
without entry of the innovating firm
Lem
license fee when m (m < n) firms buy licenses
with entry of the innovating firm
Len
license fee when n firms buy licenses
with entry of the innovating firm
First we consider auctions in the case of licenses with entry of the innovating firm.
A.1. Licenses with entry case
A.1.1. Licenses tom (m < n) firms
The willingness to pay for each incumbent firm is equal to
the diﬀerence between its profit when m firms including this firm use the new
technology with entry of the innovating firm and its profit whenm firms other than
this firm buy licenses with entry of the innovating firm.
This is because the incumbent firms know that there will bem licensees regardless of whether
or not it buys a license. The license fee for each licensee in this case is
Lem D emi C Lem   emj :
This means emi D emj .
A.1.2. Licenses to n firms
The willingness to pay for each incumbent firm in this case is equal to
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the diﬀerence between its profit when n firms use the new technology with entry
of the innovating firm and its profit when n   1 firms other than this firm buy
licenses with entry of the innovating firm.
This is because the incumbent firms know that there will be n   1 licensees when it does not
buy a license. In this case there is a minimum bidding price which is equal to the willingness
to pay for the incumbents because without the minimum bidding price no firmmakes a positive
bid. The license fee for each licensee in this case is
Len D eni C Len   e.n 1/j :
This means eni D e.n 1/j .
A.2. One-step auction in the licenses without entry case
A.2.1. Licenses tom (m < n) firms
Similarly to the above case, the license fee for each licensee in this case is
Llm D  lmi C Llm    lmj :
This means  lmi D  lmj . Denote this license fee by QLlm.
A.2.2. Licenses to n firms
The license fee for each licensee in this case is
Lln D  lni C Lln    l.n 1/j :
This means  lni D  l.n 1/j .
A.3. Two-step auction in the licenses without entry case
A.3.1. Licenses tom (m < n) firms
(1) The first step.
The innovating firm sells licenses to m firms at auction without its entry conditional on
that the bidding price must not be smaller than the minimum bidding price, which is
equal to the willingness to pay for the incumbent firms described below, and at least m
firms make bids. m highest bidders win the licenses, and ties are resolved at random.
If at most m   1 firms make bids, then the auction proceeds to the next step.
(2) The second step.
The innovating firm sells licenses to m firms at auction with its entry. Then, the
willingness to pay for each incumbent firm in this step is the diﬀerence between its profit
when m firms including this firm get licenses with entry of the innovating firm and its
profit when m firms other than this firm get licenses with entry of the innovating firm.
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At the first step of the auction, each incumbent firm has a will to pay the following license fee;
the diﬀerence between its profit when m firms including this firm get licenses
without entry of the innovating firm and its profit when m firms other than this
firm get licenses with entry of the innovating firm.
There is a minimum bidding price which is equal to the willingness to pay for the incumbent
firms. The license fee for each licensee in this case is
Llm D  lmi C Llm   emj :
This means  lmi D emj . Denote this license fee by OLlm.
A.3.2. Licenses to n firms
(1) The first step.
The innovating firm sells licenses to n firms at auction without its entry conditional on
that the bidding price must not be smaller than the minimum bidding price, and n firms,
that is, all firms make bids. If n firms make bids, they get licenses. If at most n 1 firms
make bids, then the auction proceeds to the next step.
(2) The second step.
The innovating firm sells licenses to n firms at auction with its entry. Then, the willing-
ness to pay for each incumbent firm in this step is the diﬀerence between its profit when
n firms get licenses with entry of the innovating firm and its profit when n  1 firm other
than this firm get licenses with entry of the innovating firm.
At the first step of the auction, each incumbent firm has a will to pay the following license fee;
the diﬀerence between its profit when n firms get licenses without entry of the
innovating firm and its profit when n  1 firm other than this firm get licenses with
entry of the innovating firm.
There is a minimum bidding price which is equal to the willingness to pay for the incumbent
firms. The license fee for each licensee in this case is
Lln D  lni C Lln   e.n 1/j :
This means  lni D e.n 1/j .
Credibility of the two-step auctionwhen there aremore than two incumbent firms depends on
the comparison of the total profit of the innovating firm when it sells licenses tom (m  n 1)
firms with its entry and its profit when it sells licenses to m (m  n   1) firms without its
entry. Formally, if
emi C Lem > QLlm;
the two-step auction is credible, and if
emi C Lem < QLlm;
the two-step auction is not credible. Whether the two-step auction is credible or not depends
on the number of licensees (m). Thus, it may be complicated.
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